Word to the Wise

Yesterday Judge Zagel ruled on Comcast’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. I think the tone of the ruling was clear in the first 3 sentences.

Plaintiff e360Insight, LLC is a marketer. It refers to itself as an Internet marketing company. Some, perhaps even a majority of people in this country, would call it a spammer

In the end, the judge ruled that Comcast has immunity for their actions under 230(c) and ruled in their favor.

I grant judgment on the pleadings with respect to the complaint as a whole on the grounds that § 230(c) precludes proceeding on any of the claims. Alternatively, I dismiss the remainder of the claims for the reasons stated above.

The judge has one of the better summaries of 230(c) in regards to email.

The initial question is whether the kind of unsolicited and bulk e-mails (whether you call them spam or mass marketing mailings) are the sort of communications an entity like Comcast could deem to be objectionable. A few courts have addressed the issue and answered “yes.” See Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (company that forwarded spam complaints to ISPs entitled to immunity). Indeed, section 230 imposes a subjective element into the determination of whether a provider or user is immune from liability. Zango, Inc. v Kaspersky Lab, Inc., No. 07-0807, slip. op. at 6-7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2007) (noting that section 203(c)(2) only requires that the provider subjectively deems the blocked material objectionable); Pallorium v. Jared, 2007 WL 80955, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 1, 2007) (same). This standard furthers one of section 230’s goals “to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services.” § 230(b)(3). Here, there is no question that Comcast, through the use of its numerous programs, software, and technologies, considers the material sent by e360 via e-mail objectionable.

He goes on to evaluate the protections of 230(c) against the text of CAN SPAM

But compliance with CAN-SPAM, Congress decreed, does not evict the right of the provider to make its own good faith judgment to block mailings.  Section 7707 of the Act says that nothing in the Act shall “have any effect on the lawfulness . . . under any other provision of law, of the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of Internet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, relay, handle or store certain types of electronic mail messages.”  See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas, 420 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2005); § 7707(c).

Under the law, a mistaken choice to block, if made in good faith, cannot be the basis for
liability under federal or state law.  To force a provider like Comcast to litigate the question of
whether what it blocked was or was not spam would render § 230(c)(2) nearly meaningless.

As the judge has now determined that the protections of 230(c) do apply, and goes on to answer the question “was Comcast acting in good faith” with the answer “e360 did not adequately plead Comcast wasn’t acting in good faith.”

Two other things of note in the ruling. One was the Judge’s comment on the alleged denial of service attack. It was a footnote in the ruling, but worth mentioning.

e360 says, in its brief, that Comcast has also engaged in “denial of service” attacks on their system which acts overwhelm e360’s system and prevent it from sending or receiving e-mails.  e360 also claims that Comcast sends incorrect bounce information to their system with respect to e-mail addresses of those on e360’s opt-in list.  I do not understand what is being alleged.  If e360 means that Comcast is refusing to transmit the e-mails and communicates this fact to e360 by bouncing them back, then it is e360’s choice to submit very large numbers of e-mails for transmission which, after the first Comcast block, it should have known of this possibility and been prepared for it (perhaps by altering its protocols to allow for a connection to be disconnected).  It is hard to see that sending e-mails back, in this context, is a denial of service
“attack” when it is designed to prevent legitimate users of a service from using the service.  It is not an “attack” to prevent users not believed to be legitimate from using a service.  It is also impossible to see the allegations here as stating that Comcast intentionally accesses a computer without authorization.  Unless these computers operate in non-standard ways, the initiation of access is laid at e360’s door, not at Comcast’s.

The other was the judge’s agreement with Comcast that even if 230 did not apply, that e360 failed to state claims on all counts. Another footnote:

Comcast argues that, absent its statutory protection, e360 has failed to state claims on all of its Counts.
(A)  I agree that the Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Count is difficult to understand.  I have found no cases in which refusal to allow a plaintiff to run an advertisement in a medium with wide circulation (and thus reducing sales) of plaintiff’s products  or those from whom he is selling constitutes such tortious interference.  Usually the prospective economic advantage is far more concrete than selling to public which consists of people on a very, very long opt-in list.  It is illegal to interfere with a fair number of prospects, but usually they are a class of easily identified individuals and usually the interference is that of the defendant interacting directly with the prospective buyers.
(B)  The claim under CFAA under the “ denial of service” theory fails for the reasons
stated above.
(C)  Comcast is a private enterprise and has no obligation to honor the free speech rights of e360.  C.B.S. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).  Comcast provides services traditionally performed by private enterprises, not the government.  The government does not,  with very few exceptions, connect people with one another through the Internet.  Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (publicly regulated utility).  The fact that an enterprise is regulated, licensed, or funded by the government does not make the enterprise part of the state.  Wilcher v. City of Akron, 498 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2007).

There we go. Comcast prevails, e360 loses. There is no word yet on whether Comcast will continue with the countersuit.

Not being a lawyer, I do not have the credentials or training to fully comment on the ruling. However, in my non-legal opinion, I think the judge demonstrated a firm grasp of the policy and technology involved in blocking spam and applied the law in a way that makes it very, very clear that blocking mail is legal and that a marketing company cannot use the law to attempt to get mail delivered.

Full text of the ruling is up at SpamSuite. I hear he’s currently /.ed so his site might load a little slowly.

Today I have a copy of the e360 briefing on Comcast’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On a superficial level, the writing of e360’s lawyers not as clear or concise as that of the Comcast lawyers. When reading Comcast’s writings it is clear to me that the lawyers have a story to tell and it has a beginning, a middle and an end. They take the reader through the setup, then through the evidence and case law, then proceed to the remedies requested. There is a clear narrative and progression and it all makes sense and the reader is never left standing. This briefing meanders hither and yon, prompting one person to ask was this written on the back of a placemat in crayon.

I still think e360 is misunderstanding or misstating some crucial facts in this case.

e360 argues that because they comply with CAN SPAM, then their mail is therefore not spam. This is not true (see Al’s post, and my post and John’s post). Complying with CAN SPAM does not mean you are not sending spam. I will go even farther to say that sending super-duper-double-confirmed-with-a-cherry-on-top-opt-in email does not mean you will always get through an ISPs filters. The ISPs have moved away from being in the position of having to decide between a mailer who insists a recipient opted in and a recipient who marks mail as spam. Now, the ISPs look at complaints and if you annoy your recipients, then the ISP is going to filter that mail. It is all about relevancy. It is all about not sending mail that is going to make those users hit the “this is spam” button. And endusers have never cared about permission, spam is email they do not want and if you send it, they will complain about it.

They also seem to have this impression that Comcast is letting all e360’s competitors send email to Comcast. Again, it is all about relevancy. If e36o’s competitors are sending mail that users do not complain about then yes, that mail is going to get through. The problem here is not that Comcast is picking and choosing which ESP gets to mail the users, it is that the recipients are choosing which emails they do not object to. Send emails recipients find useful and relevant, and it does not matter that you scraped their address off a website, they will not report it as spam.

Comcast points out that under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) they are not liable for blocking content. The CDA provides for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of content under 2 separate circumstances: 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2). 230(c)(1) says

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

ISPs are not liable for anything said by someone else on their service or network. The issue here is not activity by someone else on the Comcast network, though, the issue is activity by Comcast. Accordingly, none of Comcast’s filings have claimed immunity under 230(c)(1).

Comcast has claimed immunity under 230(c)(2), which says

2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).

Under section (c)(2), it seems Comcast is not liable for actions taken in good faith to block material “otherwise objectionable.” Curiously, in the briefing submitted today, e360 ignores 230(c)(2) and speaks only to case law regarding section (c)(1). e360 even states

e360 is not seeking to hold Comcast liable for the actions or statements of a third-party, rather e360 is seeking to hold Comcast liable for its own actions: Comcast’s indiscriminate and improper blocking of e360’s emails.

If this is truly the case, then why did e360 spend an entire page (out of a 16 page brief) discussing case law around 230(c)(1)?

e360 does comment later that Comcast clearly has immunity to block spam, if it deems spam objectionable, but that as e360 does not send spam, the mail should not be blocked. I think this is tenuous, and may be an issue only because Comcast called e360 a spammer and the email spam. e360 further claims they can produce proof of opt-in for every email address they send email to. I expect that Comcast has e360 email to addresses that never signed up to receive the email (role accounts, employees, etc). I also fully expect e360 to produce opt-in data about those accounts. I am actually looking forward to seeing this question litigated: what constitutes proof of opt-in.

The next argument is legal in nature. e360 says that Comcast is interfering in a business relationship. Comcast says that e360 has a statutory obligation to state the exact relationship that is being interfered with and that Comcast must know of the relationship. e360 argues that as Comcast is blocking the mail, Comcast knows exactly who is being interfered with.

e360 is also vociferously defending its claim that Comcast is committing a denial of service attack on Comcast. The Comcast lawyers had a wonderful analogy for this claim in their motion.

By way of analogy, Plaintiff’s allegations can be compared to a telemarketer who calls a phone number and receives no answer. Instead of hanging up, however, the telemarketer stays on the line and allows the phone to ring and ring, then claims that the owner of the telephone number has damaged the telemarketer because he or she was unable to make any other calls during the time the phone continued to ring.

In this brief, e360 claims the equivalent of “any properly functioning telemarketing software will not hang up if the phone on the other end is still ringing.” They are really reaching on this one.

Continuing the reaching, e360 insists that Comcast is a state actor, because they deliver mail and the USPS is considered a state actor. More legalese trying to convince the court that somehow the policies Comcast posts mean Comcast has to deliver mail sent by e360, and that clause about how Comcast has no obligation to deliver email? Oh, that clause is not relevant to the case. Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain.

All in all, I think the brief is weak and does not compare to the compelling narrative from the Comcast lawyers. While I would like to see some of the issues litigated (what constitutes proof of opt-in), I am not seeing a very persuasive brief from e360. Given the quality of the work from the Comcast lawyers, I expect lots of case law and on point arguments in their reply.